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Essay
Red-Flag Laws, Civilian Firearms Ownership and Measures of Freedom
by
Royce Barondes*
ABSTRACT
This essay provides context for an assessment of a part of the recently-enacted
Bipartisan Safer Communities Act—federal legislation funding state red-flag procedures,
which allow for seizures of firearms from persons who have not committed crimes.
First, it assesses Maryland’s experience during the first year of implementing these
procedures. The essay details computations, extrapolating from Maryland’s first-year
experience, showing that adoption of these statutes causes blameless persons to be subject
to being killed by the government at a rate comparable to or in excess of the murder rate.
Second, the essay identifies an overlooked impact of this federal legislation. The
legislation’s adoption will necessitate courts more favorably consider firearms rights
reinstatement petitions filed by criminals with old convictions. That is because
Congressional adoption of this legislation is inconsistent with the strongest premise on
which courts have heretofore rejected those claims—that courts are not competent to
assess whether individuals have a heightened propensity to commit firearms crimes.
Third, politicians admit adoption of the federal statute was a response to calls to “just
do something.” As this essay reveals, the resulting legislative spasm arose in the context
of public discourse that selectively deemphasizes events highlighting the harms arising
from adoption of red-flag laws. Ultimately, of course, the constitutionality the legislative
response will be subject to judicial review. Yet concerns that constitutional principles will
yield to public pressure are as old as the country itself. James Madison in fact expressed
some equivocation as to the desirability of a bill of rights on that basis.
In a paragraph of McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 783 (2010), referenced
in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2126 n.3 (2022),
the Supreme Court noted an absence of authority in which the Court has “refrained from
holding that a provision of the Bill of Rights is binding on the States on the ground that
the right at issue has disputed public safety implications.” Indeed, living in a society that
respects civil rights involves risks that are eliminated by a police state.
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Because federal funding of red-flag laws has been triggered by selective public
discourse, it is desirable to illuminate, as a counterweight, the salient benefits of the
constitutional provision that has been duly adopted and ought to obtain. This essay turns
to one approach that may increase the salience of information relevant to contextualizing
the judicial inquiry: that the benefits are capable of quantification. This essay expands on
the empirical evidence in the law review literature finding a statistically significant
relationship between civilian firearms ownership and indices of freedom—higher civilian
firearms ownership in a country is associated with greater freedom.
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Essay
Red-Flag Laws, Civilian Firearms Ownership and Measures of Freedom
Blackstone wrote, “[T]he law holds, that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than one
innocent suffer.”1 Similar sentiments have been expressed by others, with different ratios, e.g.,
ninety-nine to one.2 What, then, is the analogous ratio for accuracy in pre-crime3 fortunetelling,
where the stakes of an erroneous decision include death of the blameless?
Congress recently adopted legislation, the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, 4 which would
fund state implementation of statutes described as “red-flag” laws.5 That is a colloquial term for
statutes that provide a court may, on application, temporarily suspend a person’s firearms rights,
which typically is accompanied by confiscation after an ex parte process.6 Adoption of these laws,
and federal funding of them, present precisely this issue. This essay focuses on two aspects of the
adoption of these laws:
First, do these statutes designate one for inclusion in a group subject to being killed by the
government at a rate on par with the criminal murder rate? Extrapolating from Maryland’s firstyear experience:

1

5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, ch. 27, 358 (St. George Tucker Ed. 1803).
Vidar Halvorsen, Is It Better that Ten Guilty Persons Go Free Than that One Innocent Person
Be Convicted?, 23 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 2004, at 3, 3 (referencing ratios of ninetynine to one or higher).
3
Red-flag statutes as implementation of “pre-crime” is referenced in David French, Red-Flag
Laws—Yes, We Limit Liberty When There's Evidence of a Threat, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 7, 2019),
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/red-flag-laws-yes-we-limit-liberty-when-theresevidence-of-a-threat/ (“There is no ‘pre-crime’ conviction in American law.”).
4
Pub. L. No. 117-159, 136 Stat. 1313 (2022).
5
Id. § 12003(a) (to be codified at 34 U.S.C. § 10152(a)(1)(I)).
6
See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
2
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Being included in the set of persons designated by these procedures puts one in a group
subject to being killed by the government at a rate ten times greater than the country’s
murder rate caused by criminals.
Second, is there not empirical evidence that illuminates whether freedom indeed comes at a
cost, and that bears on whether civilian firearms ownership is associated with increased freedom?
If so—and that is the case—are not assessments of red-flag laws that simply focus on a subset of
the public safety implications fundamentally ill-structured?
This essay expands on the existing empirical evidence, in the law review literature, on the
relationship between indices of freedom and civilian firearms ownership in the following ways:
The relationships hold, and are statistically significant at the one-percent level (well above the
customary threshold for a required level of significance), when one controls from variables
previously omitted.
Noted scholar Gary Kleck has identified concerns with the reliability of the international
firearms ownership data typically used in empirical research, the Small Arms Survey. 7 One
concern is that the data are subject to adjustments that are not transparently detailed. 8 Gary Kleck
proposes that, in empirical investigations examining international civilian firearms ownership
rates, one reference the fraction of a country’s suicides that are committed with firearms, instead
of the Small Arms Survey Data.9 This article also uses a more intricate modeling technique,
incorporating the statistic Gary Kleck proposes to use, to confirm that the observed relationship
between freedom and firearms ownership is not a spurious artifact of the unspecified adjustments

7

See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
9
See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
8
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made in the Small Arms Survey by that survey’s authors. 10 That technique finds a positive
relationship, statistically significant at the one-percent level, between the indices of freedom and
the predicted value of registered civilian firearms.

I. RED-FLAG LAWS GENERALLY

A. Content of the Laws
Red-flag statutes authorize a court to suspend, temporarily, an individual’s firearms rights.
There are a number of salient components as to which the statutes may vary. A number of the
variations are discussed in detail in an excellent, recent article by David Kopel, who suggests a
more accurate term would be “gun confiscation orders.” 11 They may allow seizure before any
contested proceeding.12 The statutes vary as to who can initiate the proceedings. In some
jurisdictions, participation of law enforcement is required, but not so in others. 13 The extent of any
right of confrontation also varies. One state allows telephonic testimony in an ex parte proceeding
where the petitioner’s evidence in a follow-on proceeding is in writing and thus not subject to

10

The two-stage least squares modeling technique is described infra Part IV.C.
David B. Kopel, Red Flag Laws: Proceed with Caution, 45 L. & PSYCH. REV. 39, 41 (20202021) [hereinafter, Kopel, Red Flag Laws].
12
E.g., Kopel, Red Flag Laws, supra note 11, at 43; MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-603
(Westlaw through legislation effective through June 1, 2022).
13
Compare Kopel, Red Flag Laws, supra note 11, at 61 (noting the petition must be initiated
by government personnel in Connecticut, Indiana and Vermont) and Joseph Blocher & Jacob D.
Charles, Firearms, Extreme Risk, and Legal Design: “Red Flag” Laws and Due Process, 106 VA.
L. REV. 1285, 1307–1308 (2020), with Kopel, Red Flag Laws, supra note 11, at 61 (discussing the
wider assortment under California law), M D. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-602 (Westlaw through
legislation effective through June 1, 2022) (not limiting the petitioner to government personnel).
11
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cross-examination.14 Unsurprisingly, the extent to which these statutes comport with due process
requirements is unsettled.15
Status of the Laws Following Bruen. New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen 16
reiterates that the scope of impingements on firearms rights allowed by the Second Amendment is
linked to the types of restrictions that were contemplated at the time the relevant organic document
was adopted, the Second Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. 17 The analysis articulated in
Bruen focuses on the following:
[W]hen a challenged regulation addresses a general societal problem that has persisted
since the 18th century, the lack of a distinctly similar historical regulation addressing that
problem is relevant evidence that the challenged regulation is inconsistent with the
Second Amendment. Likewise, if earlier generations addressed the societal problem, but
did so through materially different means, that also could be evidence that a modern
regulation is unconstitutional.18
Although Bruen does not directly address red-flag laws, it does make reference to the relevant
historical analogy: surety statutes that did not wholly disarm a class of persons but, rather, would

14

See Kopel, Red Flag Laws, supra note 11, at 65 (discussing telephonic testimony); id. at 70–

71.

15

Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 1601 (Alito, J., concurring) (“This case also implicates
another body of law that petitioner glossed over: the so-called ‘red flag’ laws that some States are
now enacting. . . . Provisions of red flag laws may be challenged under the Fourth Amendment,
and those cases may come before us. Our decision today does not address those issues.”).
16
142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022).
17
The Court notes existence of “an ongoing scholarly debate on whether courts should primarily
rely on the prevailing understanding of an individual right when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified in 1868 when defining its scope (as well as the scope of the right against the Federal
Government).” Id. at 2138. It concludes “We need not address this issue today because, as we
explain below, the public understanding of the right to keep and bear arms in both 1791 and 1868
was, for all relevant purposes, the same with respect to public carry.” Id.
18
Id. at 2131.
6

allow imposition of a surety requirement were a judicial proceeding to find that there was
“reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace.” 19
Before Bruen, commentators asserted that the relevant analogy was instead to disarmament of
Native Americans (as well as vague reference those who had allegiance to the King). 20 This view
is debunked by two factors: Bruen references, as the relevant analogy for broad disarmament of
groups of persons, those surety statutes21 and an old English statute that allowed disarmament of
persons whose conduct would “terrify” members of the public “with evil intent or malice.” 22 That
is the relevant precedent articulated by the Court—not disarmament of groups not fully benefitting
from civil rights. And the Court’s discussion expressly discounts, as not relevant to understanding
the Second Amendment’s scope, a Founding-Era statute that allowed disarmament of slaves. 23
That is, the Court rejects, as inapposite to applying the Second Amendment, Founding-Era
disarmament targeted based on race on which those commentators seek to found the
constitutionality of far-reaching firearms restrictions.

19

Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2148.
Dru Stevenson, In Defense of Felon-in-Possession Laws, 43 CARDOZO L. REV. 1573, 1586
(2022) (“One particularly compelling rebuttal to the historical pedigree argument is the
forthcoming article by Joseph Blocher and Caitlan Carberry, who start with the well-documented
fact that the founding generation often prohibited gun ownership for groups deemed “dangerous”
to society or the local community, some of whom (like Native Americans or political dissidents)
would not be subject to such laws today.”). The relevant historical description was described by a
court as follows: “law-abiding slaves, free blacks, and Loyalists.” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 200 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing
ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA 116
(2011)).
21
Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2148–50.
22
Id. at 2141. The concurrence recites the slipshod, unreasoned Heller dicta concerning
longstanding restrictions. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2162 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). But, of course,
these red-flag confiscation orders are not long-standing. Blocher and Charles assert the first was
adopted in 1999. Blocher & Charles, supra note 13, at 1294–95.
23
Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2144.
20
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Second, what is relevant is the Founding-Era treatment of persons who generally had civil
rights, not Founding-Era restrictions on persons who were not conceptualized as being fully
possessed of civil rights generally, whether as to bearing arms or voting or something else. Insofar
as in the Founding Era persons who were not fully possessed of civil rights were deprived of one
civil right, that does not mean the civil right was curtailed but, rather, that certain classes of persons
did not fully benefit from civil rights. The Bruen opinion confirms this by referencing the historical
understanding of the right to possess arms in public by “Persons of Quality.” 24
Additionally, the Court makes an observation of particular relevance to this essay. The opinion
recognizes that an objective of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and contemporaneous
statutes was to eradicate the targeting of a group of persons who through disarmament were more
generally deprived of civil rights.25 That is, the Court references a historical justification of the
right to bear arms that is centered on consideration of the consequential impact on civil rights
generally.
Absence of Efficacy. The Bipartisan Safer Communities Act expressly excludes a requirement
for government-paid counsel as a requirement for federal funding. 26 District of Columbia v. Heller
has confirmed that owning a firearm is a civil right secured by the Constitution. 27 So, adoption of
red-flag statutes subjects the indigent to the potential deprivation of an enumerated civil right,
through judicial proceedings where they will not be represented by counsel.

24

Id. at 2142.
Id. at 2151–52.
26
Those funded by the federal government must include: “the right to be represented by counsel
at no expense to the government.” Bipartisan Safer Communities Act., 26 Pub. L. No. 117-159,
§ 12003(a)(2), 136 Stat. 1313, 1326 (2022) (to be codified at 34 U.S.C. § 10152(a)(1)(I)).
27
554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
25

8

That circumstance may commend caution in adoption of these statutes. But there is more. Two
months before enactment, a researcher who previously an announced agenda of specifying more
groups to disarm—“The third thing I’d recommend is we expand the criteria we now use for
denying the purchase and possession of firearms” 28—co-authored a work examining whether these
statutes decreased murder rates. The research does not find evidence supporting the view that these
statutes decrease murders. “In this cross-sectional study, the gun violence restraining order law
was not significantly associated with a reduction in firearm violence of any kind during its first 4
years of implementation, 2016 to 2019. . . . These results suggest that gun violence restraining
order implementation did not reduce population-level rates of firearm violence in San Diego
County, but future studies should investigate whether there were individual-level benefits to those
directly affected.”29
Unexpected Implications of Federal Imprimatur on Red-Flag Laws. Another implication of
the federal funding of these state statutes urges caution—the way their adoption ought to influence

28

Sasha Abramsky, Wresting Gun Policy from the Hands of the Radical Fringe: A Q&A with
Garen Wintemute, THE NATION (Dec. 16, 2012), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/
wresting-gun-policy-hands-radical-fringe-qa-garen-wintemute/
[http://web.archive.org/web/
20210616201629/https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/wresting-gun-policy-hands-radicalfringe-qa-garen-wintemute/].
29
Veronica A. Pear et al., Firearm Violence Following the Implementation of California’s Gun
Violence Restraining Order Law, 5 JAMA Network Open at 1/11 (Apr. 2022) (emphasis added)
(co-authors include Garen J. Wintemute of the “Violence Prevention Research Program”),
available at https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/articlepdf/2790705/pear_2022_
oi_220150_1648234846.28801.pdf. See also Rachel Dalafave, An Empirical Assessment of
Homicide and Suicide Outcomes with Red Flag Laws, 52 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 867, 900 (2021) (“Red
flag laws are not associated with statistically significant changes in homicides rates.”); John R.
Lott, Jr., and Carlisle E. Moody, Do Red Flag Laws Save Lives or Reduce Crime?, at 4 (Dec. 28,
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3316573 (“Red flag laws had no
significant effect on murder, suicide, the number of people killed in mass public shootings,
robbery, aggravated assault, or burglary. There is some evidence that rape rates rise.”); Kopel, Red
Flag Laws, supra note 11, at 51 (noting the statutes date to 1999 but, “No research has found any
statistically significant reduction in crime—including mass shooting fatalities—from confiscation
laws.”).
9

judicial treatment of firearms reinstatement petitions, by persons with prior criminal convictions.
Federal law generally prohibits firearms possession by persons who have committed felonies or
state misdemeanors punishable by more than two years imprisonment, among others. 30 The ban is
permanent, unless the wrongdoer’s civil rights are restored by expungement of the crime or the
like.31 Federal statutes do not generally tether an ongoing disarmament to current dangerousness.
An illustration of a disqualifying conviction from 2016 is provided by United States v. Phillips,32
a prior conviction of “misprision of felony”—in that case, according to the briefing, failing “to
report the sale of drugs by a person who was selling marijuana.” 33
To date, courts have generally declined to entertain the substance of individualized
constitutional challenges to these restrictions, summarily rejecting them. There are two primary
principles on which courts found this conclusion. One is an assertion that courts, as institutions,
are unable to identify accurately whether a person has a heightened propensity to violence. In
Binderup v. Attorney General, a Federal appellate court justified rejecting constitutional challenges
in these words: “[T]he Supreme Court and our Court have recognized in the Second Amendment
context that the Judicial Branch is not ‘institutionally equipped’ to conduct ‘a neutral, wideranging investigation’ into post-conviction assertions of rehabilitation or to predict whether
particular offenders are likely to commit violent crimes in the future.” 34

30

18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(20); 922(g)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 117-___).
Recently signed legislation in some cases limits the ban arising from a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence to five years where the relationship was a “dating relationship.” Bipartisan
Safer Communities Act., Pub. L. No. 117-159, § 12005(c)(2), 136 Stat. 1313, 1333 (2022) (adding
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(C)). The drafting raises issues concerning its precise import that are beyond
the scope of this work.
32
827 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2016).
33
Appellant's Opening Brief at 19, Phillips, 827 F.3d 1171 (Nos. 14-10448, 14-10449), (stating
Phillips “failed to report the sale of drugs by a person who was selling marijuana to Mr. Phillips.”).
34
Binderup v. Att’y Gen. United States of Am., 836 F.3d 336, 350 (3d Cir. 2016) (opinion
announcing judgments of the court) (quoting United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 77 (2002)).
31

10

Because Congress has implicitly concluded courts are competent in this arena by explicitly
funding that judicial activity, courts will no longer be able to abnegate a duty to weigh individual
claims seeking reinstatement of firearms rights. Firearms bans arising from stale crimes will no
longer be validated merely by pointing to an institutional inability to make those assessments.
The second principle on which courts have relied is suspect to the core. This approach is
founded on the notion that a person who previously has been convicted of a serious crime is no
longer “virtuous.” That approach to construing constitutional rights has been thoroughly
discredited when presented outside the context of firearms law. “In modern constitutional law,
rights are not selectively doled out by legislatures to those whom elected officials deem to be
sufficiently virtuous or worthy.”35
In sum, legislative efforts to fund these red-flag laws may have unintended consequences. In
courts that proceed forthrightly, applying the principles articulated in their opinions, federal
funding of implementation of red-flag procedures necessitates more favorable consideration of
petitions, by those with prior criminal convictions, for reinstatement of firearms rights.

35

Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1563 n.67 (2009).
11

II. LESS PROMINENT COSTS OF RED-FLAG LAWS

A. Red-Flag Laws Causing Government Victimization
Maryland adopted a red-flag law effective October 1, 2018.36 A news story reports 114
petitions were initiated in the first month.37 On the thirty-sixth day of the statute’s effectiveness,
police officers killed Gary J. Willis while serving an order. 38
These orders are often served without advance notice, 39 early in the morning. The story reports
the officers were “called at 5:17 a.m.” to the Willis home. Another target, Duncan Lemp, was shot
and killed while one of these petitions was served in a 4:30 a.m. no-knock raid of his dwelling on
March 12, 2020.40 David Kopel notes, “Colorado created a special exemption from its rules
limiting no-knock raids, in order to allow confiscations to always be carried out by no-knock,
without the statutory safeguards applicable to all other no-knock raids.” 41

36

Public Safety—Extreme Risk Protection Orders, 2018 Md. Laws ch. 250 (H.B. 1302),
codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 5-601 to -610; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. §§ 9-109(d)(9), 9-109.1(d)(8) (Westlaw through legislation effective through June 1,
2022).
37
Theo Hayes, Armed Man Shot by Anne Arundel County Police Dies, WBAL–TV (updated
Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.wbaltv.com/article/police-investigate-officer-involved-shooting-inferndale/24658392 [http://web.archive.org/web/20190507043055/https://www.wbaltv.com/artic
le/police-investigate-officer-involved-shooting-in-ferndale/24658392].
38
Id.
39
Kopel, Red Flag Laws, supra note 11, at 80. Blocher and Charles appear obliquely to assert
elimination of ex parte orders would make the laws “ineffective or impractical.” Blocher &
Charles, supra note 13, at 1297.
40
Michael Ruiz, Maryland Prosecutors Rule out Charges Against Cops in Death of Boogaloo
‘Martyr’ Duncan Lemp, FOX NEWS (Dec. 31, 2020), [http://web.archive.org/web/202012312
14240/https://www.foxnews.com/us/maryland-charges-boogaloo-martyr-duncan-lemp]. See also
Kopel, Red Flag Laws, supra note 11, at 55–56 (noting, “The victim’s niece said that her late uncle
‘likes to speak his mind,’ but ‘wouldn’t hurt anybody.’”); id at 56 (further quoting the victim’s
niece as “They didn’t need to do what they did.”).
41
Kopel, Red Flag Laws, supra note 11, at 51.
12

One can surely see why officers serving these orders might find it safer to serve them in the
early morning hours. However, the process is not safe for targets of the petitions.
It is somewhat disappointing to note the extent to which commentary addressing these statutes
elides the details of the government killing targets of the orders. A Westlaw search for secondary
sources since 2020, designed generally to identify discussion of red-flag orders (albeit with some
over-inclusion), identified 302 secondary source items,42 only nineteen percent of which reference
“self-defense”43 and only one percent of which reference Gary Willis. 44
The following figure contextualizes the emphasis of the academic discourse by revealing
levels of popular discourse on related subjects. It displays the relative public attention to the police
shooting of Gary Willis compared to that of Michael Brown, as reported by Google Trends:

42

Westlaw search: advanced: (“red flag law” “extreme risk protection order”) & DA(aft 12-312019) (reporting 302 Secondary Source items).
43
Westlaw search: advanced: (“red flag law” “extreme risk protection order”) & DA(aft 12-312019) & (“self-defense” or “self defense” or “selfdefense”) (reporting 57 Second Source items).
44
Westlaw search adv: advanced: (“red flag law” “extreme risk protection order”) & DA(aft
12-31-2019) & (gary +3 willis) (reporting 3 Secondary Source items).
13

Figure 1

Google Trends
Michael Brown Shooting vs. Gary Willis Shooting
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Michael Brown shooting: (United States)

7/2/2020

7/2/2021

Gary Willis Shooting: (United States)

Over the last five years, the peak value for Gary Willis shooting is 3, compared to 100 for
Michael Brown shooting. This is, of course, after the peak in popular conversation concerning the
Michael Brown shooting. The same chart, adjusted to span all coverage of the 2014 Michael Brown
shooting, is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2

Google Trends
Michael Brown Shooting vs. Gary Willis Shooting
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Notes—The peak for searches for Michael Brown shooting in Figure 1 corresponds to the almost imperceptible slight increase in
midyear 2020, approximately three-quarters from the beginning of the timeline in Figure 2.
Google Trends reports a figure of “<1” for most observations. To permit charting, a numerical value of 0.5 is included for those
data points.

The figures in the aggregate illustrate that relative to the Michael Brown shooting, the police
shooting initiated by service of a red-flag order received negligible public attention. Searches for
the red-flag shooting victim were an order of magnitude lower than the peak searches for the
Michael Brown shooting in the year following the red-flag shooting (Figure 1). And searches for
the Michael Brown shooting at that time were almost two orders of magnitude lower than those
for the Michael Brown shooting when it occurred. (Figure 1).
The lack of public attention to police shootings when red-flag orders are served commends a
review of the danger associated with serving those orders. Relevant are the domestic murder rate
and the extent to which one expects the enforcement process will grossly err in an over-inclusive

15

fashion—will kill someone who would not commit a violent crime using a firearm in the covered
time period.45
These red-flag laws are of use where the target has not committed some prior crime that by
itself gives rise to a firearms ban. Where a disqualifying crime has been committed, there is no
need to resort to a judicial determination that, for other reasons, a person should be disarmed. The
federal prohibitions are extensive—they include state misdemeanors for which one may be
incarcerated for more than two years and most felonies.46 Also giving rise to prohibitions are
convictions for misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence. 47 So too are “adjudicat[ion] as a mental
defective or . . . commit[ment] to a mental institution.”48 States are free to expand on the list.
Urging adoption of red-flag laws, then, is designed to enhance the circumstances that give rise to
a prohibition other than the commission of listed criminal acts.
A predictive process for disarming persons who have not committed disqualifying crimes
cannot be justified if it puts the government in the position of killing people, who would not
commit a serious crime with a firearm during the period covered by the order, at a rate that even
approaches the murder rate in the United States. How much it would need to be below the murder

45

That is not to say it would be satisfactory for the government to kill preemptively those who
would commit violent crime in the future.
46
18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(20); 922(g)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 117-___).
47
18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33); 922(g)(9) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 117-___), amended by
Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 117-159, § 12005(c)(2), 136 Stat. 1313, 1333
(2022) (adding 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(C) and amending 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)). The
presence of an outstanding domestic violence restraining order also creates a ban, which in that
case is limited to the duration of its pendency. 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No.
117-___).
48
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 117-___). The term “committed to a
mental institution” excludes voluntary admissions and admissions for observation. 27 C.F.R.
§ 478.11 (effective Aug. 24, 2022).
16

rate is, of course, a question of judgment. A starting point would be a factor of one-tenth or onehundredth—one or two orders of magnitude below the murder rate.
The rate for murder and nonnegligent manslaughter in the United States was below 5 per
100,000 in 2013 and 2014, thereafter surging.49 The news story cited above50 references 114 orders
in Maryland in a month—a rate that extrapolates to 1,368 per year. This is in a state with a June
2018 population of 6,042,718, or 1.85% of the U.S. population of 327,167,434. 51 Extrapolating
the Maryland experience to the country, we would expect to have approximately 74,000 orders
and 54 targets killed per year, or approximately 73 per 100,000 red-flag targets.52 So, extrapolating
the Maryland’s first-year experience, being included in the set of persons designated by these
procedures puts one in a group subject to being killed by the government at a rate ten times greater
than the country’s criminal murder rate.
It does not seem fair to disregard Maryland’s experience in the first year as an
unrepresentative, mere first-year phenomenon. Duncan Lemp was killed in the second year of the
Maryland act’s effectiveness.
Let us then turn to how over-inclusive we expect a red-flag process to be. What is relevant
here is the standard for the initial issuance of an order—which will often be in an ex parte
proceeding. That is because it is in response to the initial order that the arms will be seized.

49

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime Data Explorer (select “Homicide” in “Crime Select”),
https://crime-data-explorer.app.cloud.gov/pages/explorer/crime/crime-trend (last visited June 25,
2022) (reporting a rate of 6.5 per 100,000 in 2021) (identifying a rate for murder and nonnegligent
manslaughter).
50
See supra note 37
51
Population figures are estimates as of July 1, 2018, available in United States Census Bureau,
2018 National and State Population Estimates (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.census.gov
/newsroom/press-kits/2018/pop-estimates-national-state.html.
52
That is: 1,368 / 0.0185 = 73,946; 73,946 x ( 1 / 1368 ) = 54.05; 100,000 x 54.05 / 73,946 =
73.09.
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There will be orders issued for the wrong person, 53 on the basis of fallacious allegations (e.g.,
retaliatory petitions fomented by persona animus) 54 or for patently insufficient reasons, such as a
social media post merely depicting evidence of exercise of a constitutional right. 55 The standard
for issuance of an order may be a mere preponderance of the evidence, or even lower, including
“reasonable cause.”56 It is claimed “the most common standard of proof for ex parte orders is
reasonable, probable, or good cause of an imminent risk,” 57 with a clear minority requiring even a
preponderance of the evidence and only one “clear and convincing” evidence. 58
This typical standard does not express in quantitative terms the degree to which it validates
over-inclusive issuance of orders. But by its express terms, it is more over-inclusive than a 51:49
standard of more likely than not. One should think an ex parte proceeding is likely to be well more
over-inclusive than that. As an initial assessment, let us take it that three-quarters of the persons
subjected to orders would not have committed a violent crime with a firearm. 59 A lower bound
may be one-third: It has been reported that approximately one-third of the ex parte orders in

53

See Kopel, Red Flag Laws, supra note 11, at 56.
E.g., Sady Swanson, Fort Collins Woman Found Guilty of Lying on Red Flag Petition
Against CSU Police Officer, Fort Collins Coloradoan (Apr. 22, 2022, 4:08 p.m.),
https://www.coloradoan.com/story/news/2022/04/22/fort-collins-woman-who-filed-red-flagpetition-against-officer-convicted/7401449001/ (addressing perjury of woman who falsely stated
in a red-flag petition that she shared a child with a law enforcement officer who had fatally shot
her son).
55
See Kopel, Red Flag Laws, supra note 11, at 56–57.
56
See Kopel, Red Flag Laws, supra note 11, at 67–68.
57
Joseph Blocher & Jacob D. Charles, Firearms, Extreme Risk, and Legal Design: “Red Flag”
Laws and Due Process, 106 VA. L. REV. 1285, 1340 (2020).
58
Id.
59
See generally Alan M. Dershowitz, A Yellow Light for Red-Flag Laws, WALL ST. J., at A15
(Aug. 7, 2019) (“Research shows that any group of people identified as future violent criminals
will contain many more who won't be violent (false positives) than who will (true positives). More
true positives mean more false ones. Such groupings also fail to identify many future violent
criminals (false negatives).”).
54
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Connecticut were not affirmed in a subsequent contested proceeding. 60 Or, the lower-bound may
be one-half—the standard is lower than a preponderance of the evidence.
So, we can estimate the rate at which designation as being within the set of persons subject to
red-flag orders results targeting persons who would not commit violent firearms crimes in the
period covered by the red-flag orders, extrapolating Maryland’s experience, as follows: This
designation results in an estimated rate of a blameless person being killed by the government at a
lower-bound rate of 24 per 100,000 designated for red-flag targeting (one-third of 73 per 100,000),
with the estimated rate, derived from the nature of the standard of evidence, of about 55 per
100,000 designated (three-quarters of 73 per 100,000). This is about an order of magnitude higher
than the murder rate.
It would seem that the process is unjustifiable in the following case: It results in the target
being designated for inclusion in a group subject to a probability of being killed by the government
that is not negligible relative to the murder rate—not less than one tenth or perhaps less than one
hundredth. That would necessitate that the process be perhaps one hundred or one thousand times
better (less likely to produce the killing of the target) than Maryland’s first-year experience. 61 And
it would seem such a dangerous process would need evidence of efficacy, which is lacking.

60

David Kopel writes, “[a]bout a third of gun confiscation orders are wrongly issued against
innocent people. David Kopel, Red Flag Laws: Examining Guidelines for State Action (Mar. 26,
2019) (testimony before United States Judiciary Committee). He relies in part on Michael A.
Norko & Madelon Baranoski, Gun Control Legislation in Connecticut: Effects on Persons with
Mental Illness, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1609, 1619 (2014). Incompleteness of the relevant underlying
records noted by Norko and Baranoski, Norco & Baranoski, supra, at 1619, introduces significant
imprecision in the estimate.
61
One might say that the relevant factor range is ten times or one hundred times better, if one
wanted to look at an annualized rate, on the conservative assumption of an ultimate ten-year
prohibition.
We are here referencing the best characterization of the Maryland experience. Of course,
shootings that result in the serious bodily injury of the innocent are also relevant. And there may
well have been other events that did not come to this author’s casual attention.
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B. No Governmental Obligation to Protect
Yet the physical danger to targets associated with these red-flag proceedings is not limited to
being shot in a pre-dawn police raid. Justice Alito has stated, “According to survey data, defensive
firearm use occurs up to 2.5 million times per year.” 62 The estimated annual defensive uses of
firearms substantially exceed by about a factor of ten the annual rate of violent crime using firearms
(and, of course, the much lower annual murder rate using firearms). 63

62

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2159 (2022) (Alito, J.
concurring). See also, e.g., Alan I. Leshner et al., Committee on Priorities for a Public Health,
National Research Council, Priorities for Research to Reduce the Threat of Firearm-Related
Violence, at 15 (2013) (“Defensive use of guns by crime victims is a common occurrence, although
the exact number remains disputed (Cook and Ludwig, 1996; Kleck, 2001a). Almost all national
survey estimates indicate that defensive gun uses by victims are at least as common as offensive
uses by criminals, with estimates of annual uses ranging from about 500,000 to more than 3 million
(Kleck, 2001a), in the context of about 300,000 violent crimes involving firearms in 2008 (BJS,
2010).”).
63
Federal data presented for 2020, under the heading “All Violent Crime Offense
Characteristics,” show total of 179,867 violent crimes as involving firearms of some type.
https://crime-data-explorer.app.cloud.gov/pages/explorer/crime/crime-trend. It may be that the
way that the current interface presents the data results in it being incompletely presented. The
tabular data for 2019 reveal firearms were used in the 279,414 violent crimes in 2019 (robbery and
aggravated assault: 269,159, murder and non-negligent manslaughter, 10,258). FBI, 2019 Crime
in the United States, tbls. 19, 20, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.2019/tables/table-20;
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/tables/
table-19. The 2019 data do not reveal a frequency for rape using a firearm, but other sources
indicate that would account for less than one percent of violent crimes with firearms. Statista,
Number of forcible rape and sexual assault victims in the United States in 2020, by weapon
presence, https://www.statista.com/statistics/251931/usa--reported-forcible-rape-cases-by-weap
on-presence/ (visited June 11, 2022) (showing 1,680 for 2020).
Blocher and Charles assert, without explanatory justification, “The interest in having one’s
firearms is significant, but the justification for delay and the confirmation of judicial authorization
all point to the reasonableness of a short span of mere weeks before the final hearing.” Blocher &
Charles, supra note 13, at 1335. They do not contextualize this assertion by noting that firearms
are used defensively at a rate ten times the frequency with which they are used to commit a serious
violent crime. Although one might seek to sketch the relevant numbers as to the innocent’s loss of
self-defense, we shall limit that style of quantitative sketch to the risk of being killed during the
confiscatory seizure.
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Additionally, disarmament of a target of a red-flag proceeding is not accompanied by
government taking actual responsibility for making-up for the increased victimization risk arising
from the target being disarmed. That the government is not responsible for the consequences of
disarming someone, albeit outside the context of red-flag laws, is illustrated by Vaughn v. City of
Chicago.64 One Albert Vaughn went to the location of a group altercation to retrieve his younger
brother. He was armed with a stick. It was alleged, by Vaughn’s estate, that he was ordered by
officers at gunpoint to drop the stick, which he did. The estate also alleged Vaughn was then
approached by a person who had a bat and had been shouting obscenities at Vaughn. Vaughn’s
estate further alleged, “The defendant officers did not order the man to halt or drop the bat as he
approached Vaughn. Instead, the officers simply watched as the man clubbed Vaughn in the head
with the bat and then fled from the scene. Vaughn was transported to a local hospital where he was
pronounced dead.”65
On summary judgment, Vaughn’s estate lost. In reaching the conclusion, the court notes that
the attack came “without warning” by one “hiding in a nearby house or behind an ambulance.” 66
The court applies a standard of “whether Defendants failed to protect Albert in a way that shocks
the conscious after disarming him in a dangerous environment.” 67 In rejecting the claim, the court
provides the following analogy: “Vaughn's claim boils down to Defendants’ failure to assign a
personal bodyguard for Albert.”68 Indeed, government disarmament is not accompanied by
accountability for causing the target to be defenseless

64

No. 14 C 47, 2014 WL 3865838, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2014), later proceedings at Vaughn
v. City of Chicago, 181 F. Supp.3d 575 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (granting summary judgment for the
defendants).
65
Id. at *1.
66
Vaughn, 181 F. Supp. 3d at 575.
67
Id. at 575.
68
Id. at 575.
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C. Relationship Between Firearms Ownership and Freedom
Debate concerning firearms restrictions is often framed from the exclusive perspective of
whether the particular enactment will or will not increase public safety. For example, Fagundes
and Miller assert, “This Part explains why it is necessary to re-frame the Second Amendment’s
core value as safety, not self-defense simpliciter, and relates that purpose to the historical role of
the city as supplier of armed internal security.”69 That framing contradicts an underlying
objective—to promote freedom. Although some commentators are inclined characterize
dismissively the notion of firearms rights as furthering freedom, 70 there is wide evidence that one
objective of passage of the Fourteenth Amendment was to prevent the deprivation of ordinary civil
liberties effected by disarming persons.71
Subparts A and B have identified components of safety that are often (but not universally 72)
de-emphasized in consideration of red-flag confiscation orders.73 But equally important, the focus

69

Dave Fagundes & Darrell A. H. Miller, The City’s Second Amendment, 106 CORNELL L. REV.
677, 682 (2021).
70
E.g., Timothy Zick, Framing the Second Amendment: Gun Rights, Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties, 106 IOWA L. REV. 229, 281 (2020) (describing this conceptualization as “narratives that
construct realities” that “gun rights advocates have developed and deployed .”).
71
E.g., New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2151–52 (2022) (“An
assistant commissioner to the Bureau from Alabama similarly reported that men were ‘robbing
and disarming negroes upon the highway. . . .’” (quoting H. R. Exec. Doc. No. 70, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess., 297 (1866)).
72
E.g., Matthew Larosiere & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, Red Flag Laws Raise Red Flags of Their
Own, 45 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 155, 165 (2021) (not sketching the magnitudes); Dennis P.
Chapman, Firearms Chimera: The Counter Productive Campaign to Ban the AR-15 Rifle, 8
BELMONT L. REV. 191, 221 (2020) (referencing the killing of Gary Willis) (same).
73
E.g., Blocher & Charles, supra note 13, at 1309, 1312 (asserting, “And, as noted below, the
risk of false positives seems far outweighed by the risk of false negatives,” cross-referencing an
unsupported, brief discussion, not attempting to calculate a rate of innocent death and any
comparison of it to the criminal murder rate); Rachel Dalafave, An Empirical Assessment of
Homicide and Suicide Outcomes with Red Flag Laws, 52 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 867, 899 (2021) (in
finding a relationship between red-flag laws and decreased suicide (but not a statistically
significant relationship with homicide rates, referencing that firearms create a “negative externality
for society” and favorably commenting on statutes that “strike a balance”); Caitlin M. Johnson,
22

proffered by Fagundes and Miller is, simply, rejected by both repeated reference in the Court’s
Second Amendment jurisprudence and ordinary American notions of civil rights.
The opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller itself rejected precisely this style of balancing:
We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been
subjected to a freestanding “interest-balancing” approach. The very enumeration of the
right takes out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the
power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon. 74
Subsequently, the primary opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago noted, “The right to keep
and bear arms, however, is not the only constitutional right that has controversial public safety
implications. . . . Municipal respondents cite no case in which we have refrained from holding that
a provision of the Bill of Rights is binding on the States on the ground that the right at issue has
disputed public safety implications.”75
Additionally, in Bruen, the Court rejects New York’s attempt to posture the issue as involving
a balancing of public safety concerns—a balancing whose outcome, if relevant, New York’s
briefing asserted the petitioners conceded. New York articulated the following, unsuccessful
argument:
Kachalsky examined the “studies and data” New York introduced there, which
“demonstrat[ed] that widespread access to handguns in public increases the likelihood

Raising the Red Flag: Examining the Constitutionality of Extreme Risk Laws, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV.
1515, 1531 (2021) (asserting “the collective rights of the public still outweigh the rights of the
individual within his or her home). That articulation of a public safety rationale is in tension with
Heller and Bruen. See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text.
74
D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008).
75
561 U.S. 742, 783 (2010).
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that felonies will result in death and fundamentally alters the safety and character of
public spaces.”
Research from before and after Kachalsky shows that jurisdictions that restrict public
carry experience lower rates of gun-related homicides and other violent crimes than those
that do not . . . .
Petitioners do not address, much less attempt to refute, any of this research. 76
The Bruen Court, however, rejects the validity of that characterization of the relevant issue. It
quotes in part the above-quoted statement in McDonald77 and notes, “Put simply, there is no
historical basis for New York to effectively declare the island of Manhattan a ‘sensitive place’
simply because it is crowded and protected generally by the New York City Police Department.” 78
More generally, our Bill of Rights reflects the conclusion that there are some civil rights that
must be preserved, even though their preservation decreases public safety. Maintaining a society
not dominated by the intrusions of a police state necessitates their preservation. 79 By way of
example, then-Judge McConnel wrote: “Even people with prior convictions retain Fourth
Amendment rights; they are not roving targets for warrantless searches.” 80 One should think

76

Brief for Respondents, Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, at 43–44 (No. 20-843) (citing Kachalsky v.
Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 99 (2d Cir. 2012), abrogated by Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111).
77
Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2026 n.3 (referencing language quoted supra text accompanying note
75).
78
Id. at 2133–34..
79
McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 783, (2010) (Alito, J., announcing judgment
of the Court). (“The right to keep and bear arms, however, is not the only constitutional right that
has controversial public safety implications. . . . Municipal respondents cite no case in which we
have refrained from holding that a provision of the Bill of Rights is binding on the States on the
ground that the right at issue has disputed public safety implications.”) (quoted in part in Bruen,
142 S. Ct. at 2026 n.3).
80
United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1132 (10th Cir. 2005).
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society would be manifestly less dangerous were any prior criminal conviction to result in
permanent, complete forfeiture of freedom from unreasonable governmental searches.
A second illustration is the invalidation of former-Mayor Bloomberg’s now-rejected approach
to widespread frisking of individuals in certain locales. 81 Mayor Bloomberg touted the benefits of
the now-rejected approach in these words: “There is no doubt that stops are a vitally important
reason why so many fewer gun murders happen in New York than in other major cities—and why
we are the safest big city in America.”82 Yet that alleged safety rationale does not validate the
abrogation of a constitutionally-enumerated civil right.83

81

See Floyd v. City of New York, 770 F.3d 1051, 1054 (2d Cir. 2014) (referencing settlement
agreement under which the claimants would not oppose termination of “the District Court's
jurisdiction after a period of five years if the City can show substantial compliance with the reforms
contained in Judge Scheindlin’s remedial order”).
And we know that governmental tailoring of restrictions on firearms rights will also produce
dubious distinctions. That is because it currently does. One class of felony that not give rise to a
federal firearms prohibition is this: “Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations,
unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of
business practices.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 117-___). Federal
law allows certain business criminals to keep their firearms, but not so for the less-well-heeled
criminals. The history foreshadows problematic variations in the application of federally-funded
red-flag laws.
82
Mayor Michael Bloomberg, Address on Public Safety to NYPD Leadership (April 30, 2013),
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/151-13/mayor-bloomberg-delivers-addresspublic-safety-nypd-leadership [https://web.archive.org/web/20140807161255/https://www1.nyc.
gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/151-13/mayor-bloomberg-delivers-address-public-safety-nypdleadership].
83
One supposes that then-Mayor Bloomberg did not advance public support for the procedure
with the words, “’I think we disproportionately stop whites too much and minorities too little. It’s
exactly the reverse of what they say,’ Bloomberg said on his weekly radio show, in response to
the City Council passing two bills aimed at reining in the controversial policing tactic.” Yoav
Gonen, Bloomberg: ‘We Disproportionately Stop Whites Too Much and Minorities too Little’ in
Stop-Frisk Checks, NYPost.com (June 28, 2013), https://nypost.com/2013/06/28/bloomberg-wedisproportionately-stop-whites-too-much-and-minorities-too-little-in-stop-frisk-checks/.
25

Prior Work by Kopel, Moody and Nemerov. In a 2008 article, David Kopel, Carlisle Moody
and Howard Nemerov illuminate statistical relationships between measures of freedom and firearm
ownership.84 The measures of freedom they used were:
An annual rating provided by Freedom House 85 (in which a lower figure is better);
An annual Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International 86 (in
which a higher figure is better); and
An Index of Economic Freedom published by Heritage Foundation 87 (in which a higher
figure is better).
Data for civilian firearms per capita were taken by Kopel, Moody and Nemerov from the thencurrent edition of the Small Arms Survey. 88
At that time, per capital firearms ownership data were available for only fifty-nine countries. 89
On dividing their data set of countries into quartiles, based on per capita civilian firearms
ownership, they find countries in the quartile with the highest per capita firearm ownership have
the best average measures of freedom. However, for each of their measures, the relationship was
not monotonically increasing or monotonically decreasing among the quartiles.
They also report results of regressions estimating the relationship between measures of
freedom (some rescaled so that higher values are better for each), as the dependent variables, and
reported civilian firearms ownership as, apparently, the only independent variable. They find a
positive relationship.

84

David Kopel et al., Is there a Relationship Between Guns and Freedom? Comparative Results
from Fifty-Nine Nations, 13 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1 (2008).
85
Id. at 4.
86
Id. at 5.
87
Id. at 6.
88
Kopel et al., supra note 84, at 9.
89
Kopel et al., supra note 84, at 3.
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Availability of a larger data set and additional variables allows a more nuanced assessment of
the nature of the relationships. That is presented below.
This Essay’s Contribution to the Empirical Literature. The article by Kopel, Moody and
Nemerov appears not to have gained traction in the law review literature. A Westlaw search reveals
four citations to it.90 Only three articles in the “Secondary Sources” database in Westlaw reference
Transparency’s Corruptions Perceptions Index and the phrase “second amendment”, the Kopel,
Moody and Nemerov article being the only one referencing firearms or guns. 91
The currently available data allow for a richer, more compelling analysis. Data for civilian
firearms ownership is now available for more countries, allowing for a more powerful analysis.
Additionally, this essay incorporates other statistical information and brings to bear more
sophisticated empirical techniques that become practicable because the additional statistical
information is available.
In particular, the larger sample size makes it practicable to control for regional variations,
which allows for a more precise estimation. Additionally, the currently available data allow an
investigator to control for a country’s rate of serious crime and the extent of law enforcement
firearms possession in the country.

90

Westlaw search: adv: kopel +20 “guns #and freedom” (June 23, 2033). The results are David
B. Kopel, The Right to Arms in the Living Constitution, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 99
(2010); Christopher N.J. Roberts, Standing Our Legal Ground: Reclaiming the Duties Within
Second Amendment Rights Cases, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 235, 235 (2015); John O. McGinnis, Gun
Rights Delayed Can Be Gun Rights Denied, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 302 (2020); and Philip
M. Nichols, The Psychic Costs of Violating Corruption Laws, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 145
(2012).
91
Westlaw search: adv: (transparency /15 (“corruptions perceptions” or cpi)) & “second
amendment”) (July 21, 2022) (identifying three articles); Westlaw search: adv: (transparency /15
("corruptions perceptions" or cpi)) & "second amendment" & (firearm or gun or pistol or rifle),
identifying only Kopel et al., supra note 84.
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Lastly, as noted below,92 renowned scholar Gary Kleck has identified some concerns with the
manner in which the Small Arms Survey compiles civilian firearms ownership information. The
problems appear to be particularly acute as to unregistered civilian firearms ownership. He has
recommended an alternative statistic that may be used to assess relative civilian firearms
ownership: the fraction of suicides committed with firearms. The investigation reported in this
essay uses that information as an alternative. Application of Gary Kleck’s insight also allows one
to consider alternative empirical techniques that may address bias introduced by adjustments made
in the preparation of the reported Small Arms Survey data.
In sum, the analysis that this additional data allows reveals compelling evidence of a positive
relationship between civilian firearms possession and indicators of levels of freedom in a country.

III. DATA

The indices of freedom used in this essay are:


the Corruption Perceptions Index 2021, the most recent scores available in June 2022,
published by Transparency International (one of the indices of freedom used by Kopel,
and Moody and Nemerov);93 and

92
93

See infra note 103.
https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020.
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selected 2022 component scores published by The Heritage Foundation as part of its
series on the Index of Economic Freedom—in particular, their Judicial Effectiveness 94
and Government Integrity95 scores.96

As to the first-listed index, Philip Nichols has noted “legal scholars have comprehensively
embraced the Corruption Perceptions Index.” 97
Firearms ownership information is taken from the Small Arms Survey as of the most recent
year currently available, 2017.98 The fraction of suicides where a firearm was an instrumentality
are computed from the data reported by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME)
for 2017.99 The rates of selected serious crime, with one exception, represent the sum of the rates
for serious assault, rape and robbery, as reported for 2017 by the United Nations Office on Drugs

94

This index is described in a methodology section as:
derived by averaging scores for the following three sub-factors, all of which are weighted
equally:
• Judicial independence,
• Quality of the judicial process, and
• Perceptions of the quality of public services and the independence of the civil service.
Terry Miller et al., The Heritage Foundation, 2022 Index of Economic Freedom, at 456 (2022),
https://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2022/book/02_2022_IndexOfEconomicFreedom_METHOD
OLOGY.pdf
95
This variable is described as:
derived by averaging scores for the following three sub-factors, all of which are weighted
equally:
• Perceptions of corruption,
• Risk of bribery, and
• Control of corruption including “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.
Id. at 456–57.
96
The scores were published at: https://www.heritage.org/index/ (visited June 17, 2022).
97
Nichols, supra 91, at 201.
98
Small Arms Survey, https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-BPCivilian-held-firearms-annexe.pdf (civilian ownership data) (visited June 14, 2022); https://
www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-BP-Law-enforcement-firearms-ann
exe.pdf (visited June 14, 2022) (law enforcement ownership data).
99
https://vizhub.healthdata.org/gbd-results/ (visited July 16, 2022).
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and Crime.100 That source does not report information for China. The large population there
commended the jurisdiction not be omitted, if feasible. Corresponding numbers for 2019 (the
closest available year) for assault, rape and robbery for China were taken from another source. 101
The geographic regions were taken from the Small Arms Survey.
Summary statistics for the data are reported in Table 1, below. 102 The data in the table are
divided into two parts. On the left are statistics for all countries used in any empirical analysis. On
the right are statistics for countries used in the expanded analysis—one using more control
variables. The available sample size decreases for that subsample, because the various
supplemental sources omit information for some countries. The primary reason for omission of
countries from the subsample is the failure of the United Nations to report the data for the
referenced crimes. That is available for less than half of the countries in the full sample (86 out of
186).
However, the two samples—(i) the full sample and (ii) the subsample of countries where
statistics for the enhanced analysis provided in this essay are available—are relatively similar. The
primary exception involves the regions of the included countries. The latter subsample omits
countries from Oceania, which represent only a handful of observations in the full sample for

100

https://dataunodc.un.org/ (visited June 22, 2022).
The rates for China were computed by taking the numbers of assaults, rapes and robberies
reported for China by statista.com (visited June 29, 2022), with the rate computed by reference to
China’s 2019 population of reported by The World Bank of 1,407,745,000, https://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CN&most_recent_year_desc=false (visited June 28,
2022). Statista did not report data for 2017—the source having a gap from 2016 through 2018.
102
There were some inconsistencies in the way in which information was presented as to
countries among the various databases. For example, some have combined data for the United
Kingdom. Others have separate data for Northern Ireland, Scotland and England and Wales. And
some countries were dropped as a result of inconsistency in naming that gave rise to uncertainty.
For example, Northern Cyprus was separately identified in some databases but not others.
101
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substantially all of which the additional data are not available. Although countries from Africa
represent twenty-nine percent of the full sample, they represent only four percent of the subsample.
There is a higher rate of average civilian firearms ownership in the subsample. That is not a
concern for our purposes. Our investigation is designed to address the relationship between
freedom and civilian firearms ownership, as applied to the United States. The United States is at
the top along that dimension. A disproportionate filtering arising from limited data availability is
of diminished concern where the limit disproportionately excludes observations most dissimilar to
the observation of interest, the United States.
Table 1: Summary Statistics

All Observations
Firearms civilian per cap (x 100)
Firearms civilian registered per cap (x 100)
Firearms civilian unregistered per cap (x 100)
Law enforcement firearms per cap (x 100)
Fraction of suicides where gun instrumentality (2017)
Heritage Judicial Effectiveness
Heritage Government Integrity
Transparency Corruption Perceptions Index
Rate of selected serious crime (x 100,000)
Africa
Americas
Asia
Europe
Oceania

Mean
9.72
4.45
7.01
0.46
0.070
50.31
45.42
43.27
224.32
0.29
0.18
0.26
0.22
0.05

Min.
Max.
0.00 120.50
0.00
27.84
0.02 120.15
0.01
3.56
0.002
0.512
3.90
98.00
3.77
99.46
11.00
88.00
2.08 1254.42
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00

Observations Used in Any
Estimation Reported in Table 4
N
Mean
186
14.19
122
5.80
122
8.40
184
0.59
182
0.088
176
63.05
176
55.17
180
51.54
86 231.29
186
0.04
186
0.31
186
0.16
186
0.49
186
0.00

Min.
Max.
0.00 120.50
0.01
27.84
0.02 120.15
0.06
1.74
0.003
0.512
11.80
98.00
18.95
99.46
20.00
88.00
9.25 1254.42
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00

N
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
74
75
75
75
75
75
75

Gary Kleck criticizes use of the Small Arms Survey data.103 The Small Arms Survey attempts
to capture both registered and unregistered firearms. Gary Kleck notes data compilation for some
countries involves taking reported numbers of registered firearms and multiplying that by a factor
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Gary Kleck, The Small Arms Survey Estimates of National Civilian Firearms Ownership:
An Assessment (Sept. 25, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4065962.
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that is that the same for the covered countries, 104 and Gary Kleck further reports that “staff state
that estimates for some nations ‘have been adjusted.’” 105 To presume the ratio of registered to
unregistered firearms is consistent across countries is unfounded. 106
The data for some countries are based on surveys. However, Gary Kleck identifies a variety
of ways in which the compilation of the survey information is problematic. 107 He notes, “Since
most surveys do not ask how many guns were owned by each household or person, SAS staff
arbitrarily assume that each gun-owning household contains exactly 1.5 guns . . . .” 108 He
recommends consideration of the “percent of suicides committed with guns” as a proxy for relative
civilian firearms ownership.109 That percentage (restated as a fraction of one, i.e., percentage
divided by 100), reported for 2017, is included in the summary statistics table. The availability of
this proxy statistic also allows for implementation of models that may mitigate concerns arising
from undisclosed adjustments in the Small Arms Survey data.

IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

A. A Simple Comparison of Quartiles
As an initial step, we examine whether a basic relationship reported by Kopel, Moody and
Nemerov still obtains: a generally increasing freedom associated with increased quartile of civilian
firearms ownership. They found such a relationship, although it was not monotonically increasing.

104

Id. at 2.
Id. at 2.
106
He also notes, “SAS staff also arbitrarily drop some registration figures based on their
subjective judgment that they ‘appeared suspiciously low.’” Id. at 3.
107
Id. at 3
108
Id. at 3.
109
Id. at 8, 10.
105
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The relationship is monotonically increasing for two of the three freedom statistics: the Heritage
Judicial Effectiveness and Heritage Government Integrity scores.
As to the third freedom statistic, Transparency’s Corruption Perceptions index, the middle
two quartiles are very close to each other (40.5 and 41.8), albeit in an order reversed from the
expectation. The mean for the middle quartile of higher firearms ownership is 98.4% of that for
the middle quartile of lower firearms ownership (40.841 is 98.4% of 41.511). That variation is
smaller than that found by Kopel, Moody and Nemerov, 91.6%). 110
In sum, with a larger data set, the relationships revealed in the summary statistics become
more clearly revealed. Greater civilian firearms ownership is more clearly linked to greater
measures of freedom.
Table 2: Average Freedom Statistics Partitioned by Quartile of per Capita Civilian
Firearms Ownership

Transparency
Firearms civilian per
Heritage Judicial
Heritage Government Corruption Perceptions
cap (x 100)
Effectiveness
Integrity
Index
1
0.860
38.277
36.234
36.422
48
48
48
45
2
3.529
43.240
40.170
41.511
45
42
42
45
3
9.534
56.633
46.493
40.841
47
42
42
44
4
25.207
64.145
59.439
54.000
46
44
44
46
Total
9.719
50.309
45.423
43.267
186
176
176
180
Note—Assorted mean freedom statistics partitioned by quartile, within the observations used, of Small Arms Survey civilian
firearms ownership figures. Number of country observations below the mean of the country statistic for each quartile. Each freedom
statistic is defined so that a higher score is better (indicates more freedom).
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The Corruptions Perceptions Index for the year reported by Kopel, Moody and Nemerov is
on a different scale (0 to 10). And Kopel, Moody and Nemerov report the quartiles in the opposite
order—quartile 1 is the highest firearms ownership, as opposed to this essay, which uses the default
convention reported by the Stata software used. In any case, the corresponding figures reported by
Kopel, Moody and Nemerov are 4.75 for next-to lowest firearms ownership quartile, and 4.35 for
the next-to-highest firearms ownership quartile.
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B. Ordinary Least Squares Regressions
Our next step in confirming that the relationship between civilian firearms ownership and
freedom, identified by Kopel, Moody and Nemerov, involves identifying the basic relationship
between civilian firearms ownership and measures of freedom—as they apparently did, without
accounting for other variables. That is presented in Table 3, Panel A, models 1, 3 and 5. Each
shows there is a positive relationship between civilian firearms ownership and measure of freedom,
that is statistically significant at the one percent level (which reflects a very high level of
confidence there is a positive relationship).
These simple models show that the per capital civilian firearms ownership on its own accounts
for between eight and thirteen percent of the variation in freedom among the countries (R 2 ranging
from 0.078 to 0.130).
Our first extension of the results found by Kopel, Moody and Nemerov involves consideration
of the alternative proxy for relative civilian firearms ownership suggested by Gary Kleck: the
fraction of suicides where a firearm is the instrumentality. In this simple regression, omitting other
variables, there is a positive relationship between that proxy for relative civilian firearms
ownership and freedom, which is statistically significant at the customarily employed five-percent
confidence cut-off level as to one of the three measures of freedom: Judicial Effectiveness. It is
statistically significant at the ten-percent level for the Government Integrity measure of freedom.
So, one can reject the assertion that civilian firearms ownership is wholly unrelated to this proxy
for civilian firearms ownership. However, use of this proxy results in a significantly diminished
predictive power for the model. Only one percent to four percent of the variation in the freedom
index is accounted for by this proxy.

34

Table 3: OLS Regressions; Freedom Indices as Dependent Variable
Panel A: Full Data Set

Firearms civilian per cap
(x 100)
Fraction of suicides where
gun instrumentality (2017)
Constant

(1)
(2)
Transparency CPI
0.410***
(3.039)
33.06
(1.454)
39.22***
41.00***
(23.69)
(20.59)

(3)
(4)
Government Integrity
0.640***
(3.236)
51.58*
(1.882)
39.36***
41.87***
(17.89)
(17.61)

(5)
(6)
Judicial Effectiveness
0.720***
(2.941)
88.13**
(2.545)
43.50***
44.27***
(15.75)
(14.86)

Observations
180
176
176
175
176
175
R-squared
0.078
0.013
0.130
0.022
0.112
0.043
Note—Ordinary least squares regressions, where the dependent variable is a country’s freedom index (Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index, and The Heritage Foundation’s Judicial Effectiveness and Government Integrity scores). Higher
scores for each are better. Robust t-statistics in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Significance at the 0.01%, 0.05% and
0.10% levels shown by ***, ** and *, respectively.

Panel B: OLS Regressions with Additional Independent Variables

Law enforcement firearms per cap (x 100)
Rate of selected serious crime (x 100,000)
Firearms civilian registered per cap (x 100)
Africa
Americas
Asia
Constant

(7)
Transp. CPI
-10.67**
(-2.163)
0.0238***
(3.714)
0.792***
(2.718)
-29.05***
(-7.057)
-23.18***
(-4.889)
-11.40*
(-1.986)
57.62***
(10.57)

(8)
Gvt. Integ.
-12.77**
(-2.203)
0.0285***
(4.211)
0.928***
(2.653)
-34.24***
(-6.679)
-27.41***
(-5.235)
-13.52*
(-1.991)
62.62***
(9.810)

(9)
Jud. Effect.
-8.752
(-1.020)
0.0292***
(3.798)
1.356***
(3.498)
-28.95***
(-4.386)
-20.38***
(-3.116)
-19.99**
(-2.436)
64.18***
(7.927)

Observations
74
75
75
R-squared
0.407
0.417
0.428
Note—Ordinary least squares regressions, where the dependent variable is a country’s freedom index (Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index, and The Heritage Foundation’s Judicial Effectiveness and Government Integrity scores). Higher
scores for each are better. In these models, countries in Oceania are omitted, in light of their infrequency in the sample. Robust tstatistics in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Significance at the 0.01%, 0.05% and 0.10% levels shown by ***, ** and *,
respectively.
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The first primary extension made in this essay’s investigation allows examination of whether
other explanatory factors account for the variation between freedom statistic and civilian firearms
ownership. The initial approach to that is included in Table 3, Panel B. With the larger data set,
one can control for the geographic region of the country, the rate of selected serious crimes and
the number of firearms possessed by the country’s law enforcement, expressed per capita (x
100).111 In these estimations, civilian firearms ownership is limited to the apparently more reliably
reported registered firearms. In these models, countries in Oceania are omitted, in light of their
infrequency in the sample.
Controlling for these additional factors, the relationship between the more reliably reported
civilian firearms ownership (the registered firearms) and each statistic representing country
freedom remains positive and statistically significant at the one-percent confidence level (a level
much more demanding than the customary five-percent level for identifying statistically significant
relationships).
The results also show a statistically significant relationship, between the rate of selected
serious crime and freedom. The relationship is positive—higher serious crime rates are associated
with greater freedom. Indeed there are reasons to expect there might be such a positive relationship.
As noted above,112 the American tradition, memorialized in the Bill of Rights, involves identifying
certain actions that government cannot take that, although potentially increasing public safety, are
off-limits as improperly infringing on the core components of a free society.
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The “per capita” reflects the country’s population, not the size of its law enforcement
population.
112
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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The United States is atypical in its extent of civilian firearms ownership—a distinction that
was conceptualized at the Founding as a desirable feature. 113 In unreported results, he models were
re-estimated excluding the United States. The relationship between firearms civilian registered
per cap (x 100) and each dependent variable remains statistically significant at the one-percent
level.
The estimations show that the independent variables account for a healthy portion of the
variation in freedom among the countries. In each model, this handful of variables accounts for
forty percent or more of the variation in the freedom index (R 2 ranging from 0.407 to 0.428).
C. Two-Stage Least Squares Regressions
These results reported in Part IV.B rely on a measure of firearms ownership that is adjusted,
prior to reporting, in ways that are not fully transparent. 114

If those adjustments are related to

perceptions of freedom in the country, the assumptions underlying an ordinary least squares
model—the type of model reported in Part IV.B—are not present.
An alternative technique, which may attenuate the impact of the hidden adjustments, was also
used: a two-stage least squares model. In this approach, a country’s registered civilian firearms
ownership is (in the first stage) estimated based on the fraction of its suicides that are committed
using a firearm (and other controlling variables). In this technique, one then computes the
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As eminent litigator Stephen Halbrook, the author of the leading treatise on firearms law,
see STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FIREARMS LAW DESKBOOK (Westlaw through Sept. 2021 update)
[hereinafter, HALBROOK, DESKBOOK], has noted: “When independence was won and the federal
Constitution was proposed, James Madison heralded that Americans possess an ‘advantage of
being armed . . . over the people of almost every other nation,’ adding: ‘Notwithstanding the
military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as the public
resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people with arms.’” Stephen P.
Halbrook, Virginia’s Second Amendment Sanctuaries: Do They Have Legal Effect?, 33 REGENT
U. L. REV. 277, 300 (2021) (footnote omitted).
114
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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relationship between that estimate, consisting a combination of variables that are not directly
adjusted by the authors of the Small Arms Survey, and indices of freedom.
In particular, we model the relationship in two steps. First, we predict the amount of rate of
selected serious crime (x 100,000) given the variables: fraction of suicides where gun
instrumentality (2017) and dummy variables identifying the region, Africa, Americas and Asia.
Europe is omitted, because that is the held-out or comparison case. That is, we estimate:
firearms civilian registered per cap (x 100) = α + β1 fraction of suicides where gun
instrumentality (2017) + β2 Africa + β3 Americas + β4 Asia + random error
This produces an estimate for civilian firearms ownership in which the impact of adjustments made
by the authors of the Small Arms Survey is attenuated. Let us say, for example, that the Small
Arms Survey authors made an adjustment for the firearms figures for one country, let’s call it
Country X. That adjustment made by the survey authors for a single country would have a minor
impact on the predicted values for Country X. It would simply result in a slight adjustment of the
weighting applied to the variables not generated by the authors of the Small Arms Survey—the
continent of the country and the fraction of suicides where a firearm was the instrumentality.
The predicted values from this estimation are then used as one of the independent variables
in estimating the variable of interest—the freedom index:
freedom index = α + β1 predicted firearms civilian registered per cap (x 100) + β2 law
enforcement firearms per cap (x 100) + β3 rate of selected serious crime (x 100,000) +
random error
This style of model would operate to exclude the extent to which some unspecified factor that
is merely related to registered firearms ownership causes increased freedom. Such a cause will not
confound the results in this estimation, unless that unspecified factor is also related to fraction of
suicides where gun instrumentality (2017).
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The results of estimating the ultimate models of interest (the second step models) are shown
in Table 4, Panel A. Although the statistical software package used, Stata 15, does not
automatically report the results of the first step, those were separately estimated to report in Panel
B, models 13 through 15.
Table 4: Two-Stage Least Squares Regression
Panel A: The Final Regressions Estimating Level of Freedom

Predicted firearms civilian registered
per cap (x 100)
Law enforcement firearms
per cap (x 100)
Rate of selected serious crime
(x 100,000)
Constant

(10)
Transp. CPI
2.833***
(4.386)
-6.181
(-0.985)
0.0115
(1.525)
35.98***
(6.260)

(11)
Gvt. Integ.
3.424***
(4.518)
-7.586
(-1.026)
0.0140
(1.577)
36.51***
(5.416)

(12)
Jud. Effect
3.848***
(4.939)
-3.488
(-0.459)
0.0232**
(2.537)
37.42***
(5.399)

Observations
74
75
75
R-squared
0.074
21.15
27.52
Wald chi-squared
19.94
0.0001
0.0000
p-value
0.0002
Note—First-stage estimates the variable firearms civilian per cap (x 100) (the dependent variable), using independent variables
fraction of suicides where gun instrumentality (2017), Africa, Americas and Asia (Europe being held-out). z-statistics in parentheses
below coefficient estimates. Significance at the 0.01%, 0.05% and 0.10% levels shown by ***, ** and *, respectively.
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Panel B: Regressions Estimating the Instrumental Variable. Dependent variable is firearms
civilian registered per cap (x 100)

Fraction of suicides where gun
instrumentality (2017)
Africa
Americas
Asia

(13)
29.43***
(3.368)
-5.863*
(-1.764)
-6.178***
(-4.074)
-4.633**
(-2.446)

(14)
29.44***
(3.394)
-5.862*
(-1.776)
-6.190***
(-4.169)
-4.632**
(-2.464)

(15)
29.44***
(3.394)
-5.862*
(-1.776)
-6.190***
(-4.169)
-4.632**
(-2.464)

6.086***
(5.133)

6.085***
(5.170)

6.085***
(5.170)

Rate of selected serious crime (x 100,000)
Constant

(16)
29.39***
(3.337)
-5.904*
(-1.754)
-6.295***
(-3.481)
-4.605**
(-2.397)
0.000322
(0.121)
6.048***
(4.892)

(17)
29.40***
(3.363)
-5.905*
(-1.767)
-6.308***
(-3.569)
-4.604**
(-2.414)
0.000329
(0.125)
6.046***
(4.929)

(18)
29.40***
(3.363)
-5.905*
(-1.767)
-6.308***
(-3.569)
-4.604**
(-2.414)
0.000329
(0.125)
6.046***
(4.929)

Observations
74
75
75
74
75
75
R-squared
0.311
0.313
0.313
0.311
0.313
0.313
Note—Ordinary least squares regressions, where the dependent variable is a country’s firearms civilian registered per cap (x 100).
In these models, countries in Oceania are omitted, in light of their infrequency in the sample. t-statistics in parentheses below
coefficient estimates. Significance at the 0.01%, 0.05% and 0.10% levels shown by ***, ** and *, respectively.

Using this alternative technique, the predicted firearms civilian registered per capita (x 100)
remains positively associated with each freedom index, statistically significant at the one-percent
level. Such a positive relationship, again statistically significant at the one-percent level) is also
found in unreported results where the United States is omitted. 115 And the results shown in Panel
B indicate that using the proxy recommended by Gary Kleck, and the other variables, accounts for
a substantial percentage, thirty-one percent, of the variation in firearms civilian registered per cap
(x 100) between countries reported in the Small Arms Survey.
An R-squared value is not reported by the software for two of the models (models 10 and 11).
The absence of a reported R-squared for this style of model is not a problem:

115

Unreported results reveal that the relationships persist, at the same level of significance,
when all observations from Africa are omitted.
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. . . Does this mean our parameter estimates are no good? Not really. . . . If our two-stage
model produces estimates of these parameters with acceptable standard errors, we should
be happy—regardless of . . . R2.116
The two-stage models reported in Table 4, Panel A, have “acceptable” standard errors, i.e., are
associated statistically significant estimates.
The rate of selected serious crime (x 100,000) is not included in estimating in the predicted
firearms civilian registered per capita (x 100) in the first stage. Models 16 through 18, in Panel B,
reveal what the first-stage regression would look like were rate of selected serious crime (x
100,000) included. The point is to show that the omission is suitable. That variable would not be
statistically significant (a t-statistic of 0.13 or 0.13).117
D. How the Results Contextualize an Assessment of the Civil Right to Bear Arms
In this subpart, we will examine how the empirical results reported above contextualize the
analysis of the constitutionality of red-flag laws.
The Need to Identify Salient Benefits of an Enumerated Right. Even taking into account the
country’s law enforcement firearms per capita and the rate of selected serious crimes, lawful
civilian firearms ownership is associated with increased freedom in all model constructs. And the
relationship persists when one uses more intricate modeling techniques designed to mitigate the
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William Sribney et al., Negative and Missing R-squared for 2SLS/IV, https://
www.stata.com/support/faqs/statistics/two-stage-least-squares/ (visited July 18, 2022).
117
Moreover, the parameter estimate would indicate that any counter-factual hypothesized
relationship would not be material in magnitude. Multiplying the highest parameter estimate,
0.000329 by the average value of the serious crime parameter within the sample, 231.29, would
result in a predicted change in firearms civilian registered per capita (x 100) of 0.076. That figure
is negligible compared to the average firearms civilian registered per capita (x 100) in the sample,
14.19.
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impact of any possibility of bias in adjustments made in the Small Arms Survey data by that
survey’s authors.
The results for the rates of serious crimes illuminate the trade-off between safety and some
aspects of freedom (see models 7, 8, 9 and 12). That would be consistent with the notion that higher
freedom (along at least some dimensions) is associated with increased serious crime, but that harm
may be mitigated by increased freedom associated with lawful civilian firearms ownership.
It is not suggested that the empirical analysis reported above is tailored to address exclusively
the relationship between freedom and firearms restrictions under red-flag laws. That is not to say
the empirical analysis is irrelevant to understanding the suitability of red-flag laws. It is relevant.
And that is a consequence of the way the relevant analysis is framed by the opinion in New York
State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen,118 and the alternative approaches that the Bruen opinion
rejects.
As noted above,119 one perspective that courts could take in assessing the contours of the civil
right to bear arms involves “re-fram[ing] the Second Amendment’s core value as safety . . . .” 120
However, the opinion in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen121 founds the analysis
of restrictions on the civil right to bear arms on restrictions present at the founding (or potentially
at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment) for purposes of deriving the scope of
the of the right. This the Court styles as involving whether a “firearms regulation is part of the
historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” 122 The
framework that Bruen adopts involves first identifying general principles that guide the analysis
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142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022).
See supra note 69
120
Fagundes & Miller, supra note 69, at 682.
121
142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022).
122
Id. at 2127.
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of restrictions on the civil right to bear arms and then applying those general principles to a
particular context.
The benefits of the civil rights to bear arms and its disadvantages have disproportionate levels
of conspicuousness. The alleged harms arising from having a civil right to bear arms often are
presented in contexts where those harms can be framed in a particularly conspicuous fashion. The
alleged benefits from recognizing that civil right in the presented contexts are more diffuse.
When an unstable person criminally misuses firearms to injure multiple people, that gets
postured by proponents of red-flag laws as a basis for more widespread adoption of, or adding
extensive prohibitions to existing, red-flag laws. The framing is misleading, because one cannot
say that red-flag laws would have made a difference. The presence of a red-flag law in a
jurisdiction that experiences one of these events will often be accompanied by claims that the
problem is the relevant red-flag law was not sufficiently comprehensive.
The salience of the circumstances results in calls to “do something”, detached from cogent
analysis. President Biden, for example, stated just after adoption of the Bipartisan Safer
Communities Act,123 “ ‘Their message to us was: Do something,’ Mr. Biden said of the families
of gun violence victims. ‘How many times have you heard that? Just do something. For God’s
sake, just do something.’ ‘Well, today, we did,’ the president added.” 124 The call to do something,
untethered to either efficacy or contextualization of the civil right to bear arms as among the
various rights that are promoted for purposes of having a free society at the conscious expense of
safety concerns, was not restricted to one side of the aisle. Senator Sen. John Cornyn, Republican

123

Pub. L. No. 117-159, 136 Stat. 1313 (2022).
Emily Cochrane & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Biden Signs Bipartisan Gun Bill, Ending Years of
Stalemate in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, at A24 (June 26, 2022).
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of Texas, noted, “ I’ve received tens of thousands of calls and letters and emails with a singular
message—do something.”125
One cannot ignore the possibility that salience in public discourse of the disadvantages of
recognizing an enumerated constitutional right will influence a judge to adopt an unwarranted
curtailment of the constitutional right. James Madison in fact expressed such a concern in
referencing ambivalence to adoption of a Bill of Rights.126
As part of analyzing a reflexive legislative response to an unreasoning herd mentality that is
fomented following one of these events, it is important to identify those most salient benefits of
the civil rights to bear arms. This Part IV presents one such piece of authority. Although it does
not have the same appeal to an unreasoning crowd, it has the advantage of salience arising from
precise quantification. In sum, the context in which the general principles are applied influences
the extent to which one needs to emphasize salient benefits arising from adoption of the civil right
to bear arms. And it is for that reason that the analysis in Part IV has been presented in connection
with considering this particular restriction on the civil right to bear arms (red-flag laws).
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Consider This From NPR, On Gun Control, Two Big Steps in Opposite Directions, NPR
(June 27, 2022).
126
He wrote
My own opinion has always been in favor of a bill of rights; provided it be so framed as not to
imply powers not meant to be included in the enumeration. At the same time I have never
thought the omission a material defect, nor been anxious to supply it even by subsequent
amendment, for any other reason than that it is anxiously desired by others. I have favored it
because I supposed it might be of use, and if properly executed could not be of disservice. I
have not viewed it in an important light . . . 4 because experience proves the inefficacy of a bill
of rights on those occasions when its controul is most needed. Repeated violations of these
parchment barriers have been committed by overbearing majorities in every State. In Virginia
I have seen the bill of rights violated in every instance where it has been opposed to a popular
current.
Letter of James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), https://firstamendmentwatch.org/
history-speaks-madison-jefferson-letters-on-advisability-of-a-bill-of-rights-1787-1789/#madison
tojefferson24October1787 (visited July 19, 2022).
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Analysis Does Not Support Firearms Registration Requirements. The results in this Part IV
show a positive relationship between freedom and both civilian firearms ownership, per capita,
and civilian registered firearms ownership, per capita. It would be erroneous to conclude that this
latter relationship supports firearms registration in the United States.
The United States is atypical in terms of the number of civilian firearms per capita. As among
developed countries, the United States is atypical in that, in many parts of the United States,
civilian-owned firearms are not required to be registered. 127 In many countries, unregistered
civilian firearms are necessarily arms possessed unlawfully.
What is relevant for purposes of assessing the relationship between freedom and civilian
firearms ownership is the extent to which firearms are possessed by persons other than those who
should not possess firearms—in the American tradition, that is limited to persons who have done
something warranting disarmament, after a finding affording due process. And registration may
ultimately limit the frequency of firearms possession by the law-abiding that has a beneficial
relationship with freedom.
Although a full analysis is beyond the scope of this essay, it is noted, by way of example, that
registration is related to disarmament. In 1976, Nelson T. “Pete” Shields, identified in the Johnson
et al. text as “chairman” of the National Coalition to Control Handguns, an organization that
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Creating a federal registry of firearms through assorted information currently collected by
the federal government is unlawful. See HALBROOK, DESKBOOK, supra note 113, § 3:16. (There
is, however, a registry of privately-owned machineguns. See 18 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (prohibiting
private possession of a machinegun that is not registered) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 17-___).
Some states require registration of firearms. E.g., Sean P. Healy, Gun Trusts the Lethal Pitfalls in
Drafting Them and Firearms Issues in Probate, ch.6, Pt. IV.b.iii, in SEAN P. HEALY & ALAN S.
GASSMAN, 10TH ANNUAL FIREARMS LAW: WHAT EVERY TEXAS LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW (2021)
(State Bar of Texas CLE). Registration of long guns is, however, “novel, not historic.” Heller v.
D.C., 670 F.3d 1244, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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“would later change its name to Handgun Control, Inc., and later still to the Brady Campaign,”
stated:128
Our ultimate goal—total control of handguns in the United States—is going to take time.
My estimate is from seven to ten years. The first problem is to slow down the increasing
number of handguns being produced and sold in this country. The second problem is to
get handguns registered. And the final problem is to make the possession of all handguns
and all handgun ammunition—except for the military, policemen, licensed security
guards, licensed sporting clubs, and licensed gun collectors—totally illegal. 129
Causation. Kopel, Moody and Nemerov dedicate much of their discussion to issues of
causation.130 Discussion may bog down on whether civilian firearms ownership causes increased
freedom, or whether increased freedom causes increased civilian firearms ownership. That one is
construing a constitutional provision influences the suitable perspective to take as to that matter.
Contemporary courts are not in the position of creating the content of the civil right to bear arms
on their own. Rather, adoption of a written constitution entails the setting of the basic principles
through the process of adoption of the organic document. In the constitutional sphere, courts have
the more limited role of applying the principles that have been duly adopted to the circumstances
at hand.
As to some applications of the civil rights to bear arms, the context, as identified by the
Supreme Court, illustrates that the direction of causality is that firearms possession causes
increased freedom. That is the point of the message that one objective of making the Second
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Amendment applicable to the states was to prevent disarmament of freedmen, their being armed
inhibiting restrictions on their exercise of civil rights more generally. 131
Recent events highlight other ways in which the causality goes in that direction. In the recent
school shooting in Uvalde, Texas:
Eva Mireles’ husband, a police officer, tried to save her after she was shot at Robb
Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas, according to the director of the state Department of
Public Safety, Col. Steven McCraw.
During a Texas Senate hearing Tuesday on the police response to the shooting,
McCraw said that Mireles’ husband, Ruben Ruiz, had his gun taken away, was detained
and escorted off the scene after he received a call from his wife. 132
Being able to defend oneself or one’s loved-ones—not being dependent on the whims of a
government that has discretion to decide who is worthy of being defended and in what contexts—
is a core component of freedom. That is even more strongly the case where, as noted above, 133 in
our society, governmental exercise of that discretion is not accompanied by accountability.
Compelled dependency on an ineffectual government is the converse of freedom.
This is not a novel concept within the American tradition. Nicholas Johnson and co-authors
describe Samuel Adams as having made the “most extensive prewar American analysis of the right
to arms”134 in a newspaper article, written under the pseudonym E.A., which includes the
following:
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At the revolution, the British Constitution was again restor’d to its original principles,
declared in the bill of rights; which was afterwards pass’d into a law, and stands as a
bulwark to the natural rights of subjects. “To vindicate these rights, says Mr. Blackstone,
when actually violated or attack’d, the subjects of England are entitled first to the regular
administration and free course of justice in the courts of law—next to the right of
petitioning the King and parliament for redress of grievances—and lastly, to the right of
having and using arms for self-preservation and defence.” These he calls “auxiliary
subordinate rights, which serve principally as barriers to protect and maintain inviolate
the three great and primary rights of personal security, personal liberty and private
property”: And that of having arms for their defense he tells us is “a public allowance,
under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self preservation, when the
sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of
oppression.”135
But the relationship would relevant to construing the Second Amendment even to the extent
the causality were in the opposite direction. The point would be that the founders, and those
adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, envisioned a style of free society. The envisioned free
society had certain attributes. The drafters of our organic documents having made the choice to
preserve a civil right to bear arms, the role of courts is to implement it. That is the case where the
expressly adopted right it preserves causes what is modernly termed “freedom,” or where it is
simply one of the bundle of attributes that are collectively associated with the contemporary
concept of freedom.
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CONCLUSION

This essay begins referencing a widely-cited perspective on allowable error rates in the
criminal context. Blocher and Charles assert that, in assessing red-flag confiscation orders, the apt
comparison is to civil proceedings, not criminal proceedings. 136 Because we are assessing
conscious adoption of legislation that gives rise to a propensity to being killed by the government
at a rate that is substantial relative to the murder rate, the relevant vantage-point involves the errors
suitable in administering the criminal law (and, one supposes, the criminal law applicable to capital
crimes). Extrapolating from the experience following Maryland’s adoption of red-flag
confiscation orders reveals rates of police officers killing targets that is substantial when compared
to the murder rate.
The Supreme Court in Bruen directly rejected New York’s position that alleged safety benefits
of preventing firearms possession in public justified a style of impingement on the right to bear
arms that was not present in the Founding Era.137 The Bruen Court’s approach implements the
principle expressed in Heller that the Second Amendment was not subject to a “freestanding
‘interest-balancing’ approach.”138
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They write:
Although the consequence (denial of access to a firearm) might be significant, extreme
risk laws are a civil proceeding designed to protect both the gun owner and those close to
him or her. So long as it is complied with, the order carries no criminal sanctions, and there
is no situation in which “gun owners are presumed to be guilty and must then prove their
innocence.”160 Of course, constitutional protections apply in the civil context as well as the
criminal context, but the relevant protections have to do with due process rather than
constitutional criminal procedure rights.161 The rhetoric of criminal law is unhelpful in
understanding or resolving those civil due process issues.
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This essay expands on the existing empirical evidence that civilian firearms possession is
associated with increased freedom. The relationship is shown to remain, significant at the onepercent level, after controlling for the jurisdiction’s rate of serious crime and law enforcement
firearms per capita. And the relationship holds when one uses an alternative technique that may
address bias introduced by undisclosed adjustments made in the firearms ownership data by the
authors of the Small Arms Survey.
After Bruen, maintaining a society that enhances the public’s freedom remains central to
application of the Second Amendment to impingements on firearms rights, such as red-flag laws.
The empirical evidence supports the ongoing vitality of that focus. Civilian firearms ownership
remains associated with a government structured to enhance the freedom of the governed.
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